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Abstract
We study the behavior of several black-box
search algorithms used for generating adver-
sarial examples for natural language process-
ing (NLP) tasks. We perform a fine-grained
analysis of three elements relevant to search:
search algorithm, search space, and search
budget. When new search methods are pro-
posed in past work, the attack search space
is often modified alongside the search method.
Without ablation studies benchmarking the
search algorithm change with the search space
held constant, an increase in attack success
rate could from an improved search method
or a less restrictive search space. Addition-
ally, many previous studies fail to properly
consider the search algorithms’ run-time cost,
which is essential for downstream tasks like ad-
versarial training. Our experiments provide a
reproducible benchmark of search algorithms
across a variety of search spaces and query
budgets to guide future research in adversar-
ial NLP. Based on our experiments, we rec-
ommend greedy attacks with word importance
ranking when under a time constraint or attack-
ing long inputs, and either beam search or par-
ticle swarm optimization otherwise.
1 Introduction
Research has shown that current deep neural net-
work models lack the ability to make correct pre-
dictions on adversarial examples (Szegedy et al.,
2013). The field of investigating the adversarial
robustness of NLP models has seen growing inter-
est, both in contributing new attack methods 1 for
generating adversarial examples (Ebrahimi et al.,
2017; Gao et al., 2018; Alzantot et al., 2018; Jin
et al., 2019; Ren et al., 2019; Zang et al., 2020) and
∗* Equal contribution. Code implementation shared via
https://github.com/QData/TextAttack
1In this work, we use “adversarial example generation
methods” and “adversarial attacks” interchangeably.
better training strategies to make models resistant
to adversaries (Jia et al., 2019; Goodfellow et al.,
2014).
Recent studies formulate NLP adversarial at-
tacks as a combinatorial search task and feature
the specific search algorithm they use as the key
contribution (Zhang et al., 2019b). The search aims
to perturb a text input with language transforma-
tions such as misspellings or synonym substitutions
in order to fool a target NLP model when the pertur-
bation adheres to some linguistic constraints (e.g.,
edit distance, grammar constraint, semantic similar-
ity constraint) (Morris et al., 2020a). Many search
algorithms have been proposed for this process, in-
cluding varieties of greedy search, beam search,
and population-based search.
The literature includes a mixture of incompa-
rable and unclear results when comparing search
strategies since studies often fail to consider the
other two necessary primitives in the search pro-
cess: the search space (choice of transformation
and constraints) and the search budget (in queries to
the victim model). The lack of a consistent bench-
mark on search algorithms has hindered the use of
adversarial examples to understand and to improve
NLP models. In this work, we attempt to clear the
air by answering the following question: Which
search algorithm should NLP researchers pick for
generating NLP adversarial examples?
We focus on black-box search algorithms due
to their practicality and prevalence in the NLP at-
tack literature. Our goal is to understand to what
extent the choice of search algorithms matter in
generating text adversarial examples and how dif-
ferent search algorithms compare when we hold
the search space constant or when we standardize
the search cost. We select three families of search
algorithms proposed from literature and benchmark
their performance on generating adversarial exam-
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ples for sentiment classification and textual entail-
ment tasks. Our main findings can be summarized
as the following:
• Across three datasets and three search spaces,
we found that beam search and particle swarm
optimization are the best algorithms in terms of
attack success rate.
• When under a time constraint or when the in-
put text is long, greedy with word importance
ranking is preferred and offers sufficient perfor-
mance.
• Complex algorithms such as PWWS (Ren et al.,
2019) and genetic algorithm (Alzantot et al.,
2018) are often less performant than simple
greedy methods both in terms of attack success
rate and speed.
2 Background
2.1 Components of an NLP Attack
Morris et al. (2020b) formulated the process of
generating natural language adversarial examples
as a system of four components: a goal function,
a set of constraints, a transformation, and a search
algorithm.
Such a system searches for a perturbation from
x to x′ that fools a predictive NLP model by both
achieving some goal (like fooling the model into
predicting the wrong classification label) and ful-
filling certain constraints. The search algorithm
attempts to find a sequence of transformations that
results in a successful perturbation.
2.2 Elements of a Search Process
Search Algorithm: Recent methods proposed for
generating adversarial examples in NLP frame their
approach as a combinatorial search problem. This
is necessary because of the exponential nature of
the search space. Consider the search space for
an adversarial attack that replaces words with syn-
onyms: If a given sequence of text consists of W
words, and each word has T potential substitutions,
the total number of perturbed inputs to consider
is (T + 1)W − 1. Thus, the graph of all potential
adversarial examples for a given input is far too
large for an exhaustive search.
While heuristic search algorithms cannot guar-
antee an optimal solution, they can be employed to
efficiently search this space for a valid adversarial
example. Studies on NLP attacks have explored
various heuristic search algorithms, including beam
search (Ebrahimi et al., 2017), genetic algorithm
(Alzantot et al., 2018), and greedy method with
word importance ranking (Jin et al., 2019; Gao
et al., 2018).
Search Space: In addition to its search method, an
NLP attack is defined by how it chooses its search
space. The search space is mainly determined by
two things: a transformation, which defines how
the original text is perturbed (e.g. word substitution,
word deletion) and the set of linguistic constraints
(e.g minimum semantic similarity, correct gram-
mar) enforced to ensure that the perturbed text is
a valid adversarial example. A larger search space
corresponds to a looser definition of a valid ad-
versarial example. With a looser definition, the
search space includes more candidate adversarial
examples. The more candidates there are, the more
likely the search is to find an example that fools the
victim model – thereby achieving a higher attack
success rate (Morris et al., 2020b).
Search Cost/Budget: Furthermore, most works
do not consider the runtime of the search algo-
rithms. This has created a large, previously un-
spoken disparity in runtimes of proposed works.
Population-based algorithms like Alzantot et al.
(2018) and Zang et al. (2020) are significantly
more expensive than greedy algorithms like Jin
et al. (2019) and Ren et al. (2019). Additionally,
greedy algorithms with word importance ranking
are linear with respect to input length, while beam
search algorithms are quadratic. In tasks such as
adversarial training, adversarial examples must be
generated quickly, and a more efficient algorithm
may preferable– even at the expense of a lower
attack success rate.
2.3 Evaluating Novel Search Algorithms
Past studies on NLP attacks that propose new
search algorithms often also propose a slightly al-
tered search space, by proposing either new trans-
formations or new constraints. When new search
algorithms are benchmarked in a new search space,
they cannot be easily compared with search algo-
rithms from other attacks.
To show improvements over a search method
from previous work, a new search method must
be benchmarked in the search space of the orig-
inal method. However, many works fail to set
the search space to be consistent when compar-
ing their method to baseline methods. For exam-
ple, Jin et al. (2019) compares its TextFooler
method against Alzantot et al. (2018)’s method
without accounting for the fact that TextFooler
uses the Universal Sentence Encoder (Cer et al.,
2018) to filter perturbed text while Alzantot et al.
(2018) uses Google 1 billion words language model
(Chelba et al., 2013). A more severe case is Zhang
et al. (2019a)2, which claims that its Metropolis-
Hastings sampling method is superior to Alzantot
et al. (2018) without setting any constraints – like
Alzantot et al. (2018) does – that ensure that the
perturbed text preserves the original semantics of
the text.
We do note that Ren et al. (2019) and Zang et al.
(2020) do provide comparisons where the search
spaces are consistent. However, these works con-
sider a small number of search algorithms as base-
line methods, and fail to provide a comprehensive
comparison of methods proposed in the literature.
3 Benchmarking Setup
3.1 Defining Search Spaces
As defined in Section 2.1, each NLP adversarial
attack includes four components: a goal function,
constraints, a transformation, and a search algo-
rithm. We define the attack search space as the set
of perturbed text x′ that are generated for an origi-
nal input x via valid transformations and satisfy a
set of linguistic constraints. The goal of a search
algorithm is to find those x′ that achieves the attack
goal function (i.e. fooling a victim model) as fast
as it can.
Word-swap transformations: Assuming x =
(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xn), a perturbed text x′ can be
generated by swapping xi with altered x′i. The
swap can occur at word, character, or sentence
level, depending on the granularity of xi. Most
works in literature choose to swap out words; there-
fore, we choose to focus on search space as space
from swapping word-based transformations.
Constraints: Morris et al. (2020b) proposed a
set of linguistic constraints to enforce that x and
perturbed x′ should be similar in both meaning
and fluency to make x′ a valid potential adversar-
ial example. This indicates that the search space
should ensure x′ and x′ are close in semantic em-
bedding space. Multiple automatic constraint en-
suring strategies have been proposed in the litera-
ture. For example, when swapping word xi with x′i,
2Zhang et al. (2019a) is not considered in this paper due to
failure to replicate its results.
we can require that the cosine similarity between
word embedding vectors exi and ex′i meet certain
minimum threshold. More details on the specific
constraints we use are in Section A.1.
Now we use notation T (x) = x′ to denote trans-
formations perturbing x to x′, and assume the
j − th constraints as Boolean functions Cj(x,x′)
indicating whether x′ satisfies the constraint Cj .
Then, we can define the search space S mathemati-
cally as:
S(x) = {T (x)|Cj(x, T (x)) ∀j ∈ [m]} (1)
The goal of a search algorithm is to find x′ ∈ S(x)
such that x′ succeeds in fooling the victim model.
Table 1 describes three search spaces we use to
benchmark the search algorithms. Details of trans-
formations and constraints used in defining these
search spaces are in Appendix Section A.1.
Transformation Constraints
1 Counter-fitted
GLOVE Word
Embedding
Word embedding similarity,
BERTScore, POS consistency
2 HowNet BERTScore, POS consistency
3 WordNet USE similarity, POS consistency
Table 1: The three search spaces used for benchmark-
ing.
3.2 Heuristic Scoring Function
Search algorithms evaluate potential perturba-
tions before branching out to other solutions. In
cases of untargeted classification, the search aims
to find examples that make a classifier predict the
wrong class (label) for x′. Here the assumption is
that the ground truth label of x′ is the same as that
of the original x.
Naturally, we use a heuristic scoring function
score defined as:
score(x′) = 1− Fy(x′) (2)
where Fy(x) is the probability of class y predicted
by the model and y is the ground truth output of
original text x.
3.3 Search Algorithms
We select the following five search algorithms
proposed for generating adversarial examples, sum-
marized in Table 2. 3
3Pseudo-code of each algorithm is in A.3
Search Algorithm Deterministic? Hyperparameters Num. Queries
Beam Search (Ebrahimi et al., 2017) 3 b (beam width) O(b ∗W 2 ∗ T )
Greedy [Beam Search with b=1] 3 – O(W 2 ∗ T )
Greedy w. Word Importance Ranking (Gao
et al., 2018; Jin et al., 2019; Ren et al., 2019)
3 – O(W ∗ T )
Genetic Algorithm (Alzantot et al., 2018) 7 p (population size), g
(number of iterations)
O(g ∗ p ∗ T )
Particle Swarm Optimization (Zang et al.,
2020)
7 p (population size), g
(number of iterations)
O(g ∗ p ∗W ∗ T )
Table 2: Different search algorithms proposed for NLP attacks. W indicates the number of words in the input. T
is the maximum number of transformation options for a given input.
Beam Search For given text x, all the possible
perturbed texts x′ are generated by substituting any
xi then scored using the heuristic scoring function,
and the top b texts are kept (b is called the ”beam
width”). Then, the process repeats by further per-
turbing each of the top b perturbed texts to generate
the next set of candidates.
Greedy Search Like beam search, all possible
words xi are considered for perturbation. We take
the best perturbation across all possible perturba-
tions, and repeat until we succeed or run out of
possible perturbations. It’s equivalent to a beam
search with b set to 1.
Greedy with Word Importance Ranking (WIR)
Words of the given input x are ranked according
to some importance function. Then, in order of
descending importance, word xi is substituted with
x′i that maximizes the scoring function until the
goal is achieved, or all words have been perturbed.
There are three common ways to determine word
importance:
• UNK: Each word’s importance is determined by
how much the heuristic score changes when the
word is substituted with an UNK token (Gao et al.,
2018).
• DEL: Each word’s importance is determined by
how much the heuristic score changes when the
word is deleted from the original input (Jin et al.,
2019).
• PWWS: Each word’s importance is determined
by multiplying the change in score when the
word is substituted with an UNK token with the
maximum score gained by perturbing the word
(Ren et al., 2019).
We test an additional scheme, which we call RAND,
as an ablation study. Instead of perturbing words
in order of their importance, RAND perturbs words
in a random order.
Genetic Algorithm. We implement the genetic
algorithm of Alzantot et al. (2018). At each itera-
tion, each member of the population is perturbed by
randomly choosing one word and picking the best
x′ gained by perturbing it. Then, crossover occurs
between members of the population, with prefer-
ence given to the more successful members. The
algorithm is run for a fixed number of iterations un-
less it succeeds in the middle. Following Alzantot
et al. (2018), the population size was 60 and the
algorithm was run for at maximum 20 iterations.
Particle Swarm Optimization We implement
the particle swarm optimization (PSO) algorithm of
Zang et al. (2020). At each iteration, each member
of the population is perturbed by first generating all
potential x′ obtained by substituting any xi, then
sampling one x′ from the probability distribution
obtained from normalizing the score of each x′.
We guide each member to the best local and global
perturbed texts by randomly swapping words with
them. Following Zang et al. (2020), the population
size is set to 60 and the algorithm was run for a
maximum of 20 iterations.
Our genetic algorithm and PSO implementations
have one small difference from the original imple-
mentations. The original implementations contain
subroutines that further perturb the text without
considering whether the resulting text meets the de-
fined constraints. In our implementation, we check
if the text produced by these subroutines meets our
constraints to ensure a consistent search space.
3.4 Victim Models
We attack BERT-base (Devlin et al., 2018) and
an LSTM fine-tuned on three different datasets:
• Yelp polarity reviews (Zhang et al., 2015) (senti-
ment classification)
• Movie Reviews (MR) (Pang and Lee, 2005) (sen-
timent classification)
• Stanford Natural Language Inference (SNLI)
(Bowman et al., 2015) (textual entailment).
For Yelp and SNLI dataset, we attack 1, 000 sam-
ples from the test set, and for MR dataset, we attack
500 samples. More details on experimental setup
are in Appendix Section A.2.
3.5 Implementation
We implement all of our attacks using the NLP
attack package TextAttack4 (Morris et al., 2020a).
TextAttack provides separate modules for search
algorithms, transformations, and constraints, so
we can easily compare search algorithms without
changing any other part of the attack.
3.6 Evaluation Metrics
We use attack success rate ( # of successful attacks# of total attacks ) to
measure how successful each search algorithm is
for attacking a victim model.
To measure the runtime of each algorithm, we
use the average number of queries to the victim
model as a proxy.
To measure the quality of adversarial examples
generated by each algorithm, we use three metrics:
1. Average percentage of words perturbed
2. USE angular similarity between x and xadv
3. Percent change in perplexities of x and xadv
(using GPT-2 (Radford et al., 2019))
4 Results and Analysis
4.1 Attack Success Rate Comparison
Table 3 shows the results of each attack when
each search algorithm is allowed to query the vic-
tim model an unlimited number of times. Word im-
portance ranking methods makes far fewer queries
than beam or population-based search, while retain-
ing over 60% of their attack success rate in each
case. Beam search (b=8) and PSO are the two
most successful search algorithms in every model-
dataset combination. However, PSO is more query-
intensive. On average, PSO requires 6.3 times6
more queries than beam search (b=8), but its at-
tack success rate is only on average 1.2% higher
than that of beam search (b=8).
4.2 Runtime Analysis
Using number of queries to the victim model
as proxy for total runtime, Figure 1 illustrates
how the number of words in the input affects run-
4TextAttack is available at https://github.com/
QData/TextAttack.
6This is with one outlier (BERT-SNLI with GLOVE word
embedding) ignored. If it is included, the number jumps to
10.8.
time for each algorithm. Beam and greedy search
algorithms scale quadratically with input length,
while word importance ranking scales linearly. For
shorter datasets, this did not make a significant dif-
ference. However, for the longer Yelp dataset, the
linear word importance ranking strategies are sig-
nificantly more query-efficient. These observations
match the expected runtimes of the algorithms de-
scribed in Table 2.
For shorter datasets, genetic and PSO algorithms
are significantly more expensive than the other al-
gorithms as the size of population and number of
iterations are the dominating factors. Furthermore,
PSO is observed to be more expensive than genetic
algorithm.
4.3 Performance under Query Budget
In a realistic attack scenario, the attacker must
conserve the number of queries made to the model.
To see which search method was most query-
efficient, we calculated the search methods’ attack
success rates under a range of query budgets. Fig-
ure 2 shows the attack success rate of each search
algorithm as the maximum number of queries per-
mitted to perturb a single sample varies from 0 to
20, 000 for Yelp dataset and 0 to 3, 000 for MR and
SNLI.
For both Yelp and MR datasets, the linear (word
importance ranking) methods show relatively high
success rates within just a few queries, but are even-
tually surpassed by the slower, quadratic methods
(greedy and beam search). The genetic algorithm
and PSO lag behind. For SNLI, we see exceptions
as the initial queries that linear methods make to de-
termine word importance ranking does not pay off
as other algorithms appear more efficient with their
queries. This shows that the most effective search
method depends on both on the attacker’s query
budget and the victim model. An attacker with a
small query budget may prefer a linear method, but
an attacker with a larger query budget may aim to
choose a quadratic method to make more queries
in exchange for a higher success rate.
Lastly, we can see that RAND actually is actually
initially more successful than the UNK and DEL
methods, which is surprising since UNK and DEL
are designed to perturb the most importance words
first, thereby having each perturbation make the
largest impact possible. This is due to the overhead
involved in word importance ranking: each attack
makes W queries to determine the importance of
Model Dataset Search Method GLOVE Word Embedding HowNet WordNet
A.S. % Avg # Queries A.S. % Avg # Queries A.S. % Avg # Queries
BERT
Yelp
Greedy (b=1) 39.5 810 93.2 3, 668 63.2 1, 480
Beam Search (b=4) 42.0 2, 857 95.0 10, 766 65.9 5, 033
Beam Search (b=8) 42.7 5, 546 95.6 19, 810 67.3 9, 674
WIR (UNK) 33.2 187 92.3 344 55.3 232
WIR (DEL) 33.7 189 91.9 364 54.3 238
WIR (PWWS) 35.3 259 95.1 1, 300 58.2 395
WIR (RAND) 29.9 61 72.3 279 53.9 118
Genetic Algorithm 37.6 5, 098 89.3 11, 015 62.1 8, 257
PSO 47.2 20, 279 96.6 62, 346 74.9 28, 971
MR
Greedy (b=1) 20.6 35 78.6 214 59.4 69
Beam Search (b=4) 21.4 95 80.6 392 64.6 170
Beam Search (b=8) 21.8 175 81.2 632 65.8 303
WIR (UNK) 17.8 28 53.6 58 55.6 40
WIR (DEL) 17.0 29 53.6 59 54.0 40
WIR (PWWS) 21.0 41 73.6 205 58.2 71
WIR (RAND) 17.6 12 48.8 49 53.4 24
Genetic Algorithm 21.8 516 80.0 1, 670 65.6 1, 063
PSO 21.8 2, 413 82.4 2, 039 65.4 2, 078
SNLI
Greedy (b=1) 19.8 7 87.3 77 49.6 19
Beam Search (b=4) 20.1 12 89.2 97 52.0 33
Beam Search (b=8) 20.1 18 89.4 125 52.6 49
WIR (UNK) 19.3 22 85.1 47 47.3 30
WIR (DEL) 18.5 22 84.8 47 46.7 30
WIR (PWWS) 19.8 26 86.9 116 49.1 42
WIR (RAND) 18.3 5 82.6 30 46.2 11
Genetic Algorithm 20.0 78 89.0 477 52.2 250
PSO 20.1 1, 248 89.1 398 51.9 975
LSTM
Yelp
Greedy (b=1) 53.0 682 98.2 2, 611 80.0 982
Beam Search (b=4) 53.2 2, 313 98.5 7, 347 81.7 3, 277
Beam Search (b=8) 53.5 4, 516 98.6 13, 643 82.3 6, 240
WIR (UNK) 49.3 133 95.2 222 75.8 204
WIR (DEL) 49.1 181 95.2 230 75.3 205
WIR (PWWS) 51.2 247 97.3 1, 212 77.8 361
WIR (RAND) 47.4 57 88.3 217 74.6 98
Genetic Algorithm 51.3 5, 212 98.3 7, 408 78.5 7, 245
PSO 54.9 17, 647 98.8 34, 659 84.4 17, 145
MR
Greedy (b=1) 38.4 29 87.6 187 74.2 59
Beam Search (b=4) 38.6 71 88.6 290 75.6 131
Beam Search (b=8) 38.6 127 88.8 427 76.0 222
WIR (UNK) 35.8 27 81.0 51 72.0 36
WIR (DEL) 36.2 27 80.2 50 72.2 35
WIR (PWWS) 37.6 40 86.2 203 73.4 68
WIR (RAND) 34.4 11 68.0 40 71.8 22
Genetic Algorithm 39.0 375 88.6 949 76.0 730
PSO 39.0 1, 592 89.0 795 76.6 1, 179
Table 3: Comparison of search methods across three datasets. Models are BERT-base and LSTM fine-tuned for
the respective task. “A.S.%” represents attack success rate and “Avg # Queries” represents the average number of
queries made to the model per successful attacked sample.5
each word. Still, UNK and DEL outperform RAND
at all but the smallest query budgets.
4.4 Quality of Adversarial Examples
We selected adversarial examples whose original
text x was successfully attacked by all search al-
gorithms for quality evaluation. We see that beam
search algorithms consistently perturb the fewest
words. Furthermore, we see that a lower number of
words perturbed generally corresponds with higher
average USE similarity between x and xadv and a
smaller increase in perplexity. This indicates that
the beam search algorithms generate higher-quality
adversarial examples than other search algorithms.
Full results of quality evaluation are shown in Table
4 in the appendix.
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Figure 1: Number of queries vs. length of input text. Similar figure for LSTM models are available in section A.4
5 Discussion
5.1 How to Choose A Search Algorithm
Across all nine scenarios, we can see that choice
of search algorithm can have a modest impact on
the attack success rate. Query-hungry algorithms
such as beam search, genetic algorithm, and PSO
perform better than fast WIR methods. Out of the
WIR methods, PWWS performs significantly better
than UNK and DEL methods. In every case, we see
a clear trade-off of performance versus speed.
With this in mind, one might wonder about what
the best way is to choose a suitable search algo-
rithm. The main factor to consider is the length
of the input text. If the input texts are short (e.g.
sentence or two), beam search is certainly the ap-
propriate choice: it can achieve a high success
rate without sacrificing too much speed. However,
when the input text is longer than a few sentences,
WIR methods are the most practical choice. If one
wishes for the best performance on longer inputs
regardless of efficiency, beam search and PSO are
the top choices.
5.2 Effectiveness of PWWS Word Importance
Ranking
Across all tasks, the UNK and DEL methods per-
form about equivalently, while PWWS performs sig-
nificantly better than UNK and DEL. In fact, PWWS
performs better than greedy search in two cases.
However, this gain in performance does come at a
cost: PWWS makes far larger number of queries to
the victim model to determine the word importance
ranking. Out of the 15 experiments, PWWS makes
more queries than greedy search in 8 of them. Yet,
on average, greedy search outperforms PWWS by
2.5%.
Our results question the utility of the PWWS
search method. PWWS neither offers the perfor-
mance that is competitive when compared to greedy
search nor the query efficiency that is competitive
when compared to UNK or DEL.
5.3 Effectiveness of Genetic Algorithm
The genetic algorithm proposed by Alzantot et al.
(2018) uses more queries than the greedy-based
beam search (b=8) in 11 of the 15 scenarios, but
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Figure 2: Attack success rate by query budget for each search algorithm and dataset. Similar figure for LSTM
models are available in section A.4
only achieves a higher attack success rate in 1 sce-
nario. Thus it is generally strictly worse than the
simpler beam search (b=8), achieving a lower suc-
cess rate at a higher cost.
6 Future Work
Submodularity of transformer models. As men-
tioned in Section 5, our findings indicate that the
NLP attack problem may be approximately sub-
modular when dealing with transformer models. In
the image space, attacks designed to take advan-
tage of submodularity have achieved high query
efficiency (Moon et al., 2019). With the exception
of Lei et al. (2019), attacks in NLP are yet to take
advantage of this submodular property.
Transformations beyond word-level. Most pro-
posed adversarial attacks in NLP focus on making
substitutions at the word level or the character level.
A few works have considered replacing phrases
(Ribeiro et al., 2018) as well as paraphrasing full
sentences (Lei et al., 2019; Iyyer et al., 2018). How-
ever, neither of these scenarios has been studied
extensively. Future work in NLP adversarial ex-
amples would benefit from further exploration of
phrase and sentence-level transformations.
Motivations for generating NLP adversarial ex-
amples. One purpose of generating adversarial
examples for NLP systems is to improve the sys-
tems. Much work has focused on improvements in
intrinsic evaluation metrics like achieving higher
attack success rate via an improved search method.
To advance the field, future researchers might fo-
cus more on using adversarial examples in NLP to
build better NLP systems.
7 Conclusion
The goal of this paper is not to introduce a
new method, but to make empirical analysis to-
wards fully understanding how search algorithms
from recent studies contribute in generating natu-
ral language adversarial examples. We evaluated
six search algorithms on BERT-base and LSTM
models fine-tuned on three datasets. Our results
show that when runtime is not a concern, the best-
performing methods are beam search and parti-
cle swarm optimization. If runtime is of concern,
greedy with word importance ranking is the prefer-
able method. We hope that our findings will set a
new standard for the reproducibility and evaluation
of search algorithms for NLP adversarial examples.
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A Appendix
A.1 Search Space Choices
Here, we provide more detail about our seach
space choices.
A.1.1 Transformations
We consider three different ways of generating
substitute words:
1. Counter-fitted GLOVE word embedding
(Mrksic et al., 2016): For a given word, we
take its top N nearest neighbors in the embed-
ding space as its synonyms. 7
2. HowNet (Dong et al., 2010): HowNet is a
knowledge base of sememes in both Chinese
and English.
3. WordNet (Miller, 1995): WordNet is a lexical
database that contains knowledge about and
relationships between English words, includ-
ing synonyms.
A.1.2 Constraints
To preserve grammaticality, we require that the
two words being swapped have the same part-
of-speech (POS). This is determined by a part-
of-speech tagger provided by Flair (Akbik et al.,
2018), an open-source NLP library.
To preserve semantics, we consider three differ-
ent constraints:
1. Minimum cosine similarity of word embed-
dings: For the word embedding transforma-
tion, we require the cosine similarity of the
embeddings of the two words meet a mini-
mum threshold.
2. Minimum BERTScore (Zhang* et al., 2020):
We require that the F1 BERTScore between x
and x′ meet some minimum threshold value.
3. Universal Sentence Encoder (Cer et al., 2018):
We require that the angular similarity between
the sentence embeddings of x and x′ meet
some minimum threshold.
For word embedding similarity, BERTScore, and
USE similarity, we need to set the minimum thresh-
old value. We set all three values to be 0.9 to
encourage strong semantic similarity. We do not
apply word embedding similarity constraint for
HowNet and WordNet transformations because it
is not guaranteed that we can map the substitute
words generated from the two sources to a word
embedding space. We can also assume that the
substitute words are semantically similar to the
original words, since they originate from a curated
knowledge base.
Lastly, for all attacks carried out, we do not allow
perturbing a word that has already been perturbed
and we do not perturbed pre-defined stop words.
7We choose counter-fitted embeddings because they en-
code synonym/antonym representations better than vanilla
GLoVe embeddings (Mrksic et al., 2016).
A.2 Experiment Setup
A.2.1 Datasets
We compare search algorithms on three datasets:
the Movie Review and Yelp Polarity sentiment clas-
sification datasets and the SNLI entailment dataset.
Figure 3 shows a histogram of the number of words
in inputs from each dataset. We can see that inputs
from Yelp are generally much longer than inputs
from MR or SNLI.
A.3 Pseudocode for Search Algorithms
Before presenting the pseudocode of each search
algorithm, we define a subroutine called perturb
that takes text x and index i to produce set of per-
turbation x′ that satisfies the constraints. More
specifically, perturb is defined as following:
perturb(x, i) =
{T (x, i) | Cj(T (x, i)) ∀j ∈ {1, ...,m}}
where T (x, i) represents the transformation
method that swaps the ith word xi with its syn-
onym to produce perturbed textx′. C1, . . . , Cm
are constraints represented as Boolean functions.
Ci(x) = True means that text x satisfies con-
straint Ci.
Also, score(x) is the heuristic scoring function
that was defined in the section 3.2.
Greedy search with word importance ranking
requires subroutine for determining the importance
of each word in text x. We leave the details of
the importance functions to be found in individual
papers that have proposed them, including (Gao
et al., 2018), (Jin et al., 2019), (Ren et al., 2019).
In genetic algorithm, each population member
represents a distinct text produced via perturb and
crossover operations. Genetic algorithm has a
subroutine called sample that takes in population
member p and randomly samples a word to trans-
form with probabilities proportional to the number
of synonyms a word has. Also, we modified the
crossover subroutine proposed by Alzantot et al.
(2018) to check if child produced by crossover
operation passes constraints. If the child fails any
of the constraints, we retry the crossover for at
max 20 times. If that also fails to produce a child
that passes constraints, we randomly choose one
its parents to be the child with equal probability.
Algorithm 1 Beam Search with beam width b
Input: Original text x = (x1, x2, ...xn)
Output: Adversarial text xadv if found
best← {x}
while best == ∅ do
Xcand← ∅
for all xb ∈ best do
5: for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} do
Xcand← Xcand ∪ perturb(xb, i)
end for
end for
if Xcand 6= ∅ then
10: x∗← arg maxx′∈Xcand score(x′)
if x∗ fools the model then
return x∗ as xadv
else
best← {top b elements of Xcand}
15: . elements are ranked by their score
end if
else
End search
end if
20: end while
Algorithm 2 Greedy Search
Input: Original text x = (x1, x2, ...xn)
Output: Adversarial text xadv if found
x∗← x
while xadv not found do
Xcand← ∅
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} do
5: Xcand← Xcand ∪ perturb(x∗, i)
end for
if Xcand 6= ∅ then
x∗← arg maxx′∈Xcand score(x′)
if x∗ fools the model then
10: return x∗ as xadv
end if
else
End search
end if
15: end while
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Figure 3: Histogram of words per dataset. Yelp inputs are generally much longer than inputs from MR or SNLI.
Algorithm 3 Greedy Search with Word Importance
Ranking
Input: Original text x = (x1, x2, ...xn)
Output: Adversarial text xadv if found
R← ranking r1, . . . , rn of words x1, . . . , xn
by their importance
x∗← x
for i = r1, r2, . . . , rn in R do
Xcand← perturb(x∗, i)
5: if Xcand 6= ∅ then
x∗← arg maxx′∈Xcand score(x′)
if x∗ fools the model then
return x∗ as xadv
end if
10: else
End search
end if
end for
A.4 Analysis of Attacks against LSTM
Models
Algorithm 4 Genetic Algorithm (with population
size K and generation G)
Input: Original text x = (x1, x2, ...xn)
Output: Adversarial text xadv if found
for k = 1, . . . ,K do
i← sample(x)
Xcand← perturb(x, i)
P 0k ← arg maxx′∈Xcand score(x′)
5: end for
for g = 1, . . . , G generations do
for k = 1, . . . ,K do
Sg−1k ← score(P g−1k )
end for
10: x∗← P g−1
argmaxj S
g−1
j
if x∗ fools the model then
return x∗ as xadv
else
P g1 ← x∗
15: p = Normalize(Sg−1)
for k = 2, . . . ,K do
par1 ∼ P g−1 with prob p
par2 ∼ P g−1 with prob p
child← crossover(par1, par2)
20: i← sample(child)
Xcand← perturb(child, i)
P gk ← arg maxx′∈Xcand score(x′)
end for
end if
25: end for
A.5 Evaluation of Adversarial Examples
LSTM - Word Embedding
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Figure 4: Number of queries vs. length of input text.
LSTM - Word Embedding
101 102 103
Query Budget
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
At
ta
ck
 S
uc
ce
ss
 R
at
e
Yelp Polarity
101 102 103
Query Budget
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
LSTM - HowNet
Movie Reviews
Greedy [b=1]
Beam Search [b=4]
Beam Search [b=8]
Greedy WIR [UNK]
Greedy WIR [DEL]
Greedy WIR [RAND]
Greedy WIR [PWWS]
Genetic Algorithm
Particle Swarm Optimization
101 102 103
Query Budget
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
At
ta
ck
 S
uc
ce
ss
 R
at
e
Yelp Polarity
101 102 103
Query Budget
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
LSTM - WordNet
Movie Reviews
Greedy [b=1]
Beam Search [b=4]
Beam Search [b=8]
Greedy WIR [UNK]
Greedy WIR [DEL]
Greedy WIR [RAND]
Greedy WIR [PWWS]
Genetic Algorithm
Particle Swarm Optimization
101 102 103
Query Budget
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
At
ta
ck
 S
uc
ce
ss
 R
at
e
Yelp Polarity
101 102 103
Query Budget
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Movie Reviews
Greedy [b=1]
Beam Search [b=4]
Beam Search [b=8]
Greedy WIR [UNK]
Greedy WIR [DEL]
Greedy WIR [RAND]
Greedy WIR [PWWS]
Genetic Algorithm
Particle Swarm Optimization
Figure 5: Attack success rate by query budget for each search algorithm and dataset.
Model Dataset Search Method
GLOVE Word Embedding HowNet WordNet
Avg P.W. % Avg USE Sim ∆% Perplexity Avg P.W. % Avg USE Sim ∆% Perplexity Avg P.W. % Avg USE Sim ∆% Perplexity
BERT
Yelp
Greedy (b=1) 3.46 0.948 21.9 2.61 0.944 23.9 4.75 0.943 49.8
Beam Search (b=4) 3.31 0.949 21.1 2.54 0.945 23.1 4.48 0.945 46.7
Beam Search (b=8) 3.25 0.949 20.5 2.52 0.945 22.7 4.46 0.945 46.4
WIR (UNK) 6.52 0.929 43.8 4.95 0.920 44.9 9.08 0.924 93.0
WIR (DEL) 6.89 0.927 47.5 5.31 0.917 49.0 9.46 0.923 100
WIR (PWWS) 4.41 0.942 27.7 3.25 0.938 30.0 6.13 0.937 66.4
WIR (RAND) 8.21 0.920 59.4 7.71 0.895 78.2 11.17 0.915 125.1
Genetic Algorithm 5.10 0.936 34.3 4.35 0.926 44.6 6.7 0.932 77.2
PSO 6.64 0.929 47.6 6.27 0.911 64.4 12.29 0.91 154.3
MR
Greedy (b=1) 7.30 0.899 32.9 6.29 0.884 38.0 10.49 0.864 106.1
Beam Search (b=4) 7.27 0.9 32.4 6.22 0.885 37.2 10.31 0.865 100.3
Beam Search (b=8) 7.27 0.9 32.4 6.22 0.885 37.2 10.24 0.866 103.2
WIR (UNK) 9.49 0.883 42.5 8.06 0.863 49.6 14.49 0.844 149.5
WIR (DEL) 9.68 0.881 46.5 7.98 0.862 48.7 14.93 0.839 153.4
WIR (PWWS) 7.3 0.898 34.6 6.36 0.883 38.2 11.14 0.863 122.8
WIR (RAND) 10.15 0.881 52.7 10.19 0.844 68.9 17.47 0.827 154.6
Genetic Algorithm 8.21 0.895 36.7 6.52 0.882 39.7 12.53 0.853 126.6
PSO 8.88 0.893 41.3 6.64 0.881 40.2 16.49 0.838 187.9
SNLI
Greedy (b=1) 5.59 0.915 37.7 5.27 0.888 32.2 6.58 0.903 56.8
Beam Search (b=4) 5.59 0.915 37.7 5.26 0.888 32.1 6.54 0.903 56.4
Beam Search (b=8) 5.59 0.915 37.7 5.26 0.888 32.1 6.54 0.903 56.5
WIR (UNK) 6.56 0.911 42.7 5.98 0.886 34.7 8.09 0.899 66.5
WIR (DEL) 6.77 0.910 43.9 6.14 0.885 34.8 8.26 0.898 68.4
WIR (PWWS) 5.63 0.915 37.7 5.29 0.890 31.3 6.64 0.906 55.6
WIR (RAND) 7.06 0.909 47.6 6.6 0.882 43.9 8.68 0.895 75
Genetic Algorithm 5.72 0.915 38.4 5.43 0.887 33.5 6.78 0.902 58.8
PSO 5.77 0.915 38.5 5.47 0.887 33.7 7.03 0.902 59.4
LSTM
Yelp
Greedy (b=1) 4.09 0.942 29.6 2.5 0.948 23.9 4.62 0.946 52.3
Beam Search (b=4) 4.06 0.942 29.6 2.5 0.948 23.7 4.57 0.946 52.1
Beam Search (b=8) 4.06 0.942 29.4 2.48 0.949 23.0 4.54 0.946 51.5
WIR (UNK) 5.95 0.932 44.0 3.58 0.934 34.9 7.27 0.935 75.8
WIR (DEL) 5.93 0.932 42.3 3.66 0.935 33.7 7.28 0.935 75.7
WIR (PWWS) 4.66 0.939 34.0 2.63 0.946 24.3 5.19 0.944 57.3
WIR (RAND) 7.32 0.924 54.7 6.42 0.905 70.0 9.44 0.924 102.8
Genetic Algorithm 6.01 0.932 44.0 3.81 0.929 42.3 6.41 0.936 81.3
PSO 6.75 0.928 48.4 5.07 0.924 58.7 8.02 0.93 95.4
MR
Greedy (b=1) 7.16 0.899 33.2 6.08 0.883 38.8 10.24 0.870 100.7
Beam Search (b=4) 7.16 0.899 33.3 6.08 0.883 38.8 10.06 0.871 98.9
Beam Search (b=8) 7.16 0.899 33.6 6.08 0.883 38.8 10.03 0.871 97.6
WIR (UNK) 8.93 0.889 41.3 7.43 0.872 44.7 13.04 0.856 104.8
WIR (DEL) 9.15 0.889 44.6 7.44 0.872 43.5 13.07 0.856 107.8
WIR (PWWS) 7.42 0.898 33.4 6.13 0.883 38.9 10.54 0.871 88.5
WIR (RAND) 10.52 0.880 53.3 9.45 0.853 58.7 16.07 0.841 149.1
Genetic Algorithm 8.0 0.895 36.1 6.54 0.879 41.5 12.0 0.859 120.3
PSO 8.36 0.893 39.9 6.49 0.880 42.3 13.94 0.853 131.2
Table 4: Quality evaluation of the adversarial examples produced by each search algorithm. ”Avg P.W. %” means
average percentage of words perturbed, ”Avg USE Sim” means average USE angular similarity, and ”∆% Perplex-
ity” means percent change in perplexities. Bold numbers represent the best results.
